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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
KATHLEEN GILES, 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for public assistance 
fraud, a second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to 
reduce the offense charged where the felony of public assistance 
fraud, with which defendant was charged pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-8-1205 and -1206 (1995), is not wholly duplicative of 
the elements of the misdemeanor delineated in Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-1203 (1995)? 
Review of this issue "focuses on the trial court's legal 
conclusions, which [this Court] reviews under a correction-of-
Case No. 970289-CA 
Priority No. 2 
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error standard, according no particular deference to the trial 
court's ruling." State v. Vocrt, 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah App. 
1991) . 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict of guilt for public assistance fraud, based on 
defendant's failure to disclose material facts about her 
household composition and income that resulted in an overpayment 
in excess of $1000? 
A criminal conviction will be reversed for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on 
other grounds. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)). 
3. Did the trial court err in granting defendant's motion 
to arrest judgment where the undisputed evidence established that 
defendant and Paul Felicetti were married in front of 20 to 30 
people by an L.D.S. bishop in a ceremony on June 19, 1993? 
"The standard for determining whether an order arresting 
judgment is erroneous is the same as that applied by an appellate 
court in determining whether a jury verdict should be set aside 
for insufficient evidence." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 
(Utah 1993). A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the 
2 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is 
so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of 
the offense that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to that element. See, e.g., State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 
945 (Utah 1982); Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (1997). 
4. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to 
join Counts I and II, where each count was based on a different 
kind of fraud and where factually related instances of fraud had 
already been properly aggregated? 
Whether defendant was entitled to the consolidation of the 
two criminal counts against her into a single count presents a 
question of law, which this Court reviews for correctness. State 
v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 390 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1203, -1205, and -1206, in both their 
1995 and current versions, are attached to this brief as addenda 
A and B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of public assistance 
fraud. Count I, a second degree felony, alleged that defendant 
failed to disclose her marital status, resulting in overpayments 
exceeding $5000, between July 1, 1993, and July 31, 1995 (R. 1-
3 
5). Count II, a third degree felony, alleged that she failed to 
disclose her household composition and income, resulting in 
overpayments in excess of $1000, between August 1, 1993 and 
February 28, 1994 (Id,). 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged 
(R. 107, 110). Defendant, however, filed a motion to arrest 
judgment on count I, which the trial court granted (R. 115-19, 
126, 143, R. 156: 18) .* At sentencing, the trial court imposed 
and stayed a zero-to-five year prison term, and ordered 36 months 
of probation, $1424 in restitution, 100 hours of community 
service in lieu of a $500 fine, and a $300 recoupment fee (R. 
129-30). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the 
state responded with a timely notice of cross-appeal (R. 133, 
145) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See, e.g., State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 233-
34 (Utah 1992). Defendant and Paul Felicetti were married on 
July 19, 1993 by an L.D.S. bishop in the presence of about 20 to 
1
 The record on appeal includes three volumes of trial 
transcripts. For purposes of the appellate record, however, only 
the first page of each transcript has been paginated. 
Consequently, the state will cite each volume by its appellate 
record number, followed by a colon and the page at which the 
citation appears in that particular volume, e.g., "R. 156: 18." 
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30 people (R. 154: 90-91).2 Shortly thereafter, on August 30, 
1993, defendant applied for public assistance (R. 154: 102, 104; 
St. Ex. #6) In an interview with eligibility worker Kathy 
Cordova on September 1st, defendant orally represented that her 
marital status was single, as she had indicated on the written 
application for public assistance (R. 154: 113). At no time 
during the interview or on the application did she ever mention 
that Felicetti was her husband or that she had married him but 
thought the marriage was invalid or that he was living with her 
(Id. at 107, 108, 112-13). Similarly, when defendant completed a 
review form to confirm her continued eligibility for public 
assistance in late January of 1994, she did not indicate any 
changes in the information she had earlier provided in her 
initial application (Id. at 115) . In a subsequent in-person 
interview with Kathy Cordova to confirm the accuracy of the 
information provided on the written review form, defendant never 
mentioned marriage or Felicetti (Id. at 118). Indeed, in 
Cordova's case notes documenting "everything that's happened in a 
case," she could find no mention at all of Felicetti or, for that 
matter, any boyfriend (Id. at 119-20). 
The evidence is undisputed that the officiator filled out 
the marriage license and application. However, he then gave the 
completed documents to the parties to return to the county clerk, 
rather than returning them himself, as required by statute. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-11 (1997). The county clerk never received 
the completed documentation. 
5 
The first mention of Paul Felicetti appears in a new 
application for public assistance, dated in May of 1994 (Id. at 
144; St. Ex. #9). In that application and in the subsequent 
review forms, defendant listed Felicetti as her boyfriend and 
disclosed that he was employed (St. Exs. #9-13). 
By June of 1995, the relationship with Felicetti had 
deteriorated, and Felicetti left the home with their two children 
in common, thus eliminating defendant's receipt of benefits on 
their behalf (R. 155: 181). Defendant then consulted an attorney 
to get custody of the children (R. 155: 98). To regain the 
children's benefits, she then submitted temporary custody papers 
to the Office of Family Support, along with her "marriage license 
request form" (R. 154: 185). She told the individual to whom she 
gave the documents that she didn't think the marriage was 
"official.'' (R. 154: 185). An investigation into her marital 
status was then initiated. 
Testimony adduced at trial revealed an elaborate set of 
rules governing public assistance benefits. Three different 
kinds of public assistance benefits were identified: financial 
assistance, also referred to as A.F.D.C.; medical payments; and 
food stamp assistance (St. Exs. #17-19; R. 155: 23-24). Each 
program is governed by different rules. Thus, for example, in 
the food stamp program, the key inquiry turns on who is living in 
the household, rather than on whether a couple is married or 
6 
simply living together (R. 155: 37). For financial assistance 
purposes, however, marriage makes a significant difference in 
eligibility for benefits. Thus, if defendant is married, all her 
children are ineligible for benefits. If she is living with a 
boyfriend, however, only the children defendant and the boyfriend 
have in common are ineligibile (R. 154: 155, 168, 173; R. 155: 
59). Details of these programs are explained in this brief as 
they become relevant. 
Following trial, defendant was convicted, as charged, of two 
counts of public assistance fraud. The first count addressed her 
failure to disclose her marriage to Felicetti, resulting in 
overpayments in A.F.D.C. benefits. The trial court arrested 
judgment on this count after trial (R. 143). The second count 
addressed her failure to disclose that Felicetti was living with 
her and earning income, resulting in food stamp overpayments (R. 
129-30). Defendant now appeals from the conviction on Count I, 
and the state cross-appeals the dismissal of Count II (R. 133, 
145) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant raises three issues on appeal, and the state 
raises one issue on cross-appeal. 
First, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of her 
motion to reduce her conviction from a third degree felony to a 
class B misdemeanor on the authority of State v. Shondel, 453 
7 
P.2d 146 (Utah 1969). The felony with which defendant was 
charged, however, was not "wholly duplicative" of the elements of 
the misdemeanor. Consequently, the two crimes did not proscribe 
precisely the same conduct, and the trial court did not err in 
denying the motion. 
Second, defendant asserts that the evidence of "household 
composition" was insufficient to support her conviction because 
the state did not prove that Felicetti ate his meals in the home. 
Eating meals with the family, however, is not a statutory element 
of the crime nor did defendant request or argue that "household 
composition" should be so defined in the jury instructions. For 
this reason, her claim is waived. In addition, if she had any 
question about what the phrase meant, she had every opportunity 
to clarify it during her in-person interview with her eligibility 
worker. In any event, when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict, the evidence supports findings beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant failed to disclose material 
information about her "household composition," as that phrase is 
commonly understood. 
Third, the state cross-appeals the trial court's grant of 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment on Count I, public 
assistance fraud, a second degree felony. The charge was 
dismissed only because the trial court believed that because the 
marriage documents were never returned to the county clerk after 
8 
the wedding ceremony, the evidence of a valid marriage was 
insufficient to support the conviction. This ruling was 
incorrect as a matter of law. A marriage is valid, unless 
otherwise provided by statute, at the time it is solemnized, not 
at the time the documents are returned. It is undisputed that 
the marriage here was solemnized and that the paperwork was 
completed. To hold such a marriage invalid for a procedural 
irregularity would both contradict the plain meaning of the 
marriage statutes and fly in the face of sound public policy. 
Finally, if the state prevails on its cross-appeal, the 
Court must address the fourth issue, whether the trial court 
correctly denied defendant's motion to join the two charges. The 
trial court correctly refused to join the charges because the 
instances of public assistance fraud that were factually related 
were already joined and properly aggregated in value pursuant to 
section 76-8-1206(2). Only the instances of fraud that contained 
distinctly different facts were separated into different counts. 
Furthermore, defendant's reliance on the caselaw rule of theft 
consolidation is inapposite in a case of public assistance fraud, 
which is governed by a specific statute. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY OF 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD, OF WHICH 
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-8-1205 AND -
1206 (1995), IS NOT "WHOLLY 
DUPLICATIVE" OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
CLASS B MISDEMEANOR DELINEATED IN 
SECTION 76-8-1203 (1995), THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE THE 
OFFENSE TO A MISDEMEANOR 
Defendant argues that the class B misdemeanor delineated in 
section 76-8-1203 (1995) proscribes precisely the same conduct as 
does the third degree felony delineated in sections 7 6-8-1205 and 
-1206, of which she was convicted. Consequently, based on the 
authority of State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969), 
defendant believes that she was entitled to the lesser penalty 
and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to reduce 
Count II from a third degree felony to a class B misdemeanor (Br. 
of App. at 19, 22-25). 
Under Shondel and its progeny, if two statutes proscribe 
precisely the same conduct but assess different penalties, the 
defendant is entitled to receive the lesser penalty and 
conviction. Shondel. 453 P.2d at 147-48; State v. Gomez. 722 
P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986); see also. State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 
257, 263 (Utah 1985); State v. Voat. 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Duran. 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989). 
10 
The test for determining whether two statutes proscribe the same 
conduct is whether the "two statutes are wholly duplicative as to 
the elements of the crime." Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263; see also 
Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749; Duran, 772 P.2d at 987. If the elements 
of the crimes are not identical and each statute requires "proof 
of some fact or element not required to establish the other," the 
two statutes do not proscribe the same conduct and the defendant 
may be charged with the crime carrying the more severe penalty. 
Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749-50; State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 61 
(Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
In this instance, defendant was charged under the felony 
statutes that criminalize public assistance fraud. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-1205 and -1206 (1995) or addendum A. Defendant, 
I 
however, argues that the misdemeanor statutes governing failure 
to disclose material facts criminalize the same conduct and, 
consequently, that she should have been charged only with a 
misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 (1995) or addendum 
B. 
The state properly chose not to charge defendant under 
section 76-8-1203 because neither of its subsections properly 
encompassed the facts of this case.3 First, subsection (2) 
3
 The first subsection, delineating what must be disclosed, 
applies to both subsequent subsections: 
(1) Each person who applies for 
public assistance shall disclose to 
the Department of Human Services 
11 
provided: 
(2) Any person applying for public 
assistance who intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly fails to disclose any material 
fact required to be disclosed under 
subsection (1) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(2) (1995). This subsection would hold 
defendant culpable only for failing to disclose material facts at 
the time she initially applied for public assistance in August of 
1993. The misdemeanor charge does not require an overpayment and 
fails to recognize the linchpin of the crime at issue here -
defrauding the government in order to receive benefits beyond 
those to which defendant was entitled. The failure to disclose 
material facts pursuant to § 76-8-1203(2), is not identical to 
public assistance fraud, as defendant asserts, but is rather a 
lesser included offense of the felony charged. 
each fact that may materially 
affect the determination of his 
eligibility to receive public 
assistance, including his current: 
(a) marital status; 
(b) household composition; 
(c) employment; 
(d) income; 
(e) receipt of monetary and in-kind 
gifts; and 
(f) other resources. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(1) (1995). 
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Second, subsection (3) does not, by its plain language, 
apply to the facts of this case. That subsection provides: 
FILED 
(3) Any recipient who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose to 
the Department of Human Services any change 
in a material fact required to be disclosed 
under subsection (1), within ten days after 
the date of the change, is guilty of a class
 M A D 
B misdemeanor if that failure to disclose """ ~* '99© 
results in an overpayment. 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 (1995).4 At the outset, this section ^ 
requires a "recipient," someone who is already receiving 
benefits. In this case, Count II arises out of the fraud 
defendant committed at the time she applied for benefits in 
August, 1993. Thus, at the time of the original failure to 
disclose, while she was an applicant for public assistance 
benefits, she was not yet a "recipient." Additionally, this 
section requires a "change in a material fact." In this case, 
however, there was no change. Defendant was already married at 
the time she applied for assistance. Because this subsection 
plainly does not contemplate the circumstances presented by this 
case, it cannot serve as a statutory basis for the charge here. 
In contrast, sections 76-8-1205 and -1206, which include 
4
 The current version of the statute omits the final phrase 
of subsection (3), "if that failure to disclose results in an 
overpayment." That is, the statute now penalizes all failures to 
disclose information pertinent to public assistance awards, even 
if the failures to report do not result in overpayments. 
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Second, subsection (3) does not, by its plain language, 
apply to the facts of this case. That subsection provides: 
(3) Any recipient who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose to 
the Department of Human Services any change 
in a material fact required to be disclosed 
under subsection (1), within ten days after 
the date of the change, is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor if that failure to disclose 
results in an overpayment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203 (1995).4 At the outset, this section 
requires a "recipient," someone who is already receiving 
benefits. In this case, Count II arises out of the fraud 
defendant committed at the time she applied for benefits in 
August, 1993. Thus, at the time of the original failure to 
disclose, while she was an applicant for public assistance 
benefits, she was not yet a "recipient." Additionally, this 
section requires a "change in a material fact.'' In this case, 
however, there was no change. Defendant was already married at 
52 Am. Jur. 2d § 12 26 
the time she applied for assistance. Because this subsection 
plainly does not contemplate the circumstances presented by this 
case, it cannot serve as a statutory basis for the charge here. 
In contrast, sections 76-8-1205 and -1206, which include 
4
 The current version of the statute omits the final phrase 
of subsection (3), "if that failure to disclose results in an 
overpayment." That is, the statute now penalizes all failures to 
disclose information pertinent to public assistance awards, even 
if the failures to report do not result in overpayments. 
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additional elements, precisely address the circumstances of this 
crime. Pursuant to section 76-8-1205, a person is guilty of 
public assistance fraud if he or she "intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly . . . obtains an overpayment by violation of 
Section 76-8-1203 or 76-8-1204." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1205(11) 
Section 76-8-1206 then provides in pertinent part: 
(1) The severity of the offense of public 
assistance fraud is classified in accordance 
with the value of payments, assistance, or 
other benefits received, misappropriated, 
claimed, or applied for as follows: 
(a) second degree felony if the value 
exceeds $1000 . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206(1)(a) (1995).5 
Specifically, the elements instruction for Count II 
instructed the jury to find defendant guilty only if the state 
had proven every one of the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: that; 
1. On, about or between August 1, 1993 and 
February 28. 1994, the defendant KATHLEEN 
GILES, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
2. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 
received unauthorized public assistance 
benefits, by failing to disclose to the 
Department of Human Services each fact that 
may materially affect the determination of 
her eligibility to receive public assistance; 
to wit, household composition and income; 
5
 This statute has been amended and now penalizes public 
assistance fraud as a third degree felony if the value is between 
$1000 and $5000. Defendant received the benefit of the amended 
statute when she was sentenced (R. 129). 
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3. And such failure to disclose resulted in 
an overpayment; 
4. And the value of the payments, 
assistance, or other benefits received, 
misappropriated, claimed is or exceeds 
$1,000.00. 
R. 99 (emphasis in original). 
Plainly, the statutory requirements for public assistance 
fraud pursuant to sections 76-8-1205 and -1206 are not "wholly 
duplicative" of the elements of failure to disclose pursuant to 
section 76-8-1203(2). Indeed, the state had to prove two 
additional elements in order to prevail on the felony charge. 
First, the state had to prove that the failure to disclose 
resulted in an overpayment, an element plainly missing from the 
misdemeanor defined in section 76-6-1203(2). And, second, the 
state had to establish the specific amount of the overpayment, 
another element absent from the misdemeanor. Because these two 
elements distinguish the felony of public assistance fraud 
pursuant to sections 76-8-1205 and -1206 from the misdemeanor of 
failure to disclose pursuant to section 76-8-1203(2), defendant's 
argument based on Shondel fails. For this reason, the trial 
court correctly denied defendant's motion to reduce the offense 
charged. 
15 
POINT TWO 
WHEN PROPERLY VIEWED IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S 
VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S DETERMINATION 
THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO DISCLOSE 
MATERIAL FACTS ABOUT HOUSEHOLD 
COMPOSITION AND INCOME, RESULTING 
IN OVERPAYMENTS IN EXCESS OF $1000 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury's verdict of guilt to the second degree felony 
of public assistance fraud, based on her failure to accurately 
disclose her "household composition" (Br, of App. at 25-26).6 
While she concedes that the evidence "arguably indicate[s]" that 
Paul Felicetti lived with her from August 1, 1993, through 
February 28, 1994, she nonetheless argues that the state must 
prove that Felicetti shared food with the family in order to 
establish the element of "household composition" (Br. of App. at 
29-30). In essence, defendant's argument seems to be that unless 
the state adduced specific proof that Felicetti ate his meals at 
home, the fact that he lived with her is irrelevant for purposes 
of determining her "household composition." 
Defendant's argument that the state was obliged to adduce 
evidence that Felicetti ate in the home is grounded in language 
6
 This count was factually grounded in food stamp fraud. 
See R. 155: 35-38, R. 129-30. Under such circumstances, the 
pivotal inquiries are whether Felicetti was a member of the 
household and, if so, whether he was earning income (R. 155: 37, 
54) . 
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included on the application for public assistance. The back of 
the instruction sheet states in pertinent part: "If you are 
applying for food stamps, please answer these questions about 
your household. A Food Stamp household includes your spouse, 
parents, children, brothers and sisters and ALL other people who 
live and share food with you." See, e.g., St. Ex. #S-6. 
Defendant uses this language to assert that the statutory 
definition of "household composition," as that phrase is used in 
section 76-8-1203(1)(b), includes a requirement that the state 
must prove not only that Felicetti lived with defendant but that, 
as a separate matter of proof, he ate in the home as well. 
Defendant's argument fails. While the instructions on the 
application for public assistance provide guidance for 
individuals completing the application, the instructions do not 
constitute the law for purposes of public assistance fraud.7 
Furthermore, if Felicetti was living with the family but not 
eating with them, defendant had the opportunity to disclose that 
fact in Question #13 on her application, which inquired: "Do you 
7
 The term "household composition," while nowhere defined 
in the statutes governing public assistance fraud, has a commonly 
understood meaning of persons living together as a single unit. 
See Black's Law Dictionary 666 (5th ed. 1979) ("A family living 
together. . . Those who dwell under the same roof and compose a 
family"). While defendant now presses for a specialized 
definition of that phrase, she did not request such an 
instruction at trial. Absent such a request, her claim is waived 
on appeal. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987); Utah 
R. Crim. P. 17(c). 
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share food with everyone in your home? (List below anyone who 
doesn't)." See, e.g., St. Ex. S-6. While defendant initially 
answered that question in the negative, she failed to list the 
name of the individual with whom food was not shared. 
Subsequently, in a face-to-face interview, the response was 
changed to "yes."8 This change at least indicates that Question 
#13 was the subject of some discussion at the face-to-face 
interview between defendant and the eligibility worker. Thus, if 
defendant sought to clarify that she lived with Felicetti but 
that he did not share food with the family, she certainly had the 
opportunity to disclose the "material facts." 
Instead, however, she argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the conviction. The law is well settled 
that an appellate court's role in reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence following a criminal conviction is a limited one. 
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). "Where there is 
any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can 
be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we 
will sustain the verdict." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). A conviction 
Kathy Cordova, the eligibility worker, testified that she 
went over all the written responses in her oral interview to 
ensure their accuracy and make any necessary clarifications or 
corrections (R. 154: 105-06). 
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will be reversed on insufficiency grounds only when the evidence 
is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the crime." State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other 
grounds. State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
In the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the jury 
had before it the following evidence relevant to household 
composition between August 1, 1993, and February 28, 1994. 
Julie Cook, the manager of a building on Red Maple Road 
containing four apartments, testified that defendant lived with 
Felicetti in one of the apartments during the time period in 
question and that they, along with three children, "appeared to 
be a family" (R. 154: 66-67). In addition, the state introduced 
a one-year lease for the Red Maple Road apartment, dated August 
1, 1993, with Paul Felicetti listed as the lessor and tenants 
listed as Robert Giles, Paul Giles, Ashton Felicetti, Kathy 
Felicetti, and Paul Felicetti (St. Ex. #S-2).9 The state also 
introduced an income statement for Felicetti, indicating that he 
was employed during the time period indicated in Count II (St. 
Ex. #16). From this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude 
that, between August 1, 1993 and February 28, 1994, defendant and 
Felicetti were living together on Red Maple Road and, in 
9
 Paul and Robert Giles are defendant's children from a 
previous relationship. Ashton Felicetti is the daughter of 
defendant and Paul Felicetti. 
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addition, that Felicetti was earning income. 
Furthermore, Alex Yei, an auditor for the Office of Recovery 
Services, testified that "[f]or the food stamp program. . . 
[i]t's the members of the household that are living together or 
cohabitating together. When we determine eligibility we look at 
the household income, the entire household's income to determine 
their assistance" (R. 155: 37). Based on Felicetti's earnings 
coming into the residence he shared with defendant, Yei testified 
that, under the food stamp program, defendant had received 
overpayments amounting to $1424 between August 1, 1993 and 
February 28, 1994 (R. 155: 35, 38) .10 
In contrast to the evidence that defendant and Felicetti 
were living together and that Felicetti was earning a steady 
income are defendant's notable omissions in her communications 
with the Office of Family Support. Kathy Cordova, defendant's 
eligibility caseworker during the time in question, testified 
that she met twice with defendant, first to ensure the accuracy 
of defendant's initial application for public assistance and then 
again, several months later, to conduct a review and to note any 
changes in defendant's circumstances (R. 154: 106, 115). 
In her initial application for assistance, dated August 30, 
1993, and in an interview the next day with Cordova, defendant 
m
 10
 In sentencing defendant on this charge, the trial court 
ordered $1424 in restitution, thus verifying the food stamp 
overpayment as the factual basis for the conviction (R. 129-30). 
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made no mention of Felicetti nor did she mention any earnings 
coming into the home from him or from any other source (R. 154: 
107, 110; St. Ex. #S-6). And, in a review form filed on January 
25, 1994, defendant again nowhere mentioned Felicetti or any 
boyfriend or income (R. 154: 118-19; St. Ex. #S-7). 
The jury thus had before it evidence of omissions on 
defendant's public assistance application and review forms; 
defendant's related silence during face-to-face interviews with 
her public assistance eligibility caseworker; the testimony of 
her landlord and the documentary evidence in the apartment lease, 
both indicating that Felicetti was a member of the household; the 
verification of Felicetti's income during the relevant time 
period; and overpayment calculations in the amount of $1424 by an 
auditor from the Office of Recovery Services. Given this 
evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, 
the jury had sufficient evidence from which to conclude that 
defendant had defrauded the government by failing to disclose 
household composition and income, resulting in overpayments in 
excess of $1000. Defendant's claim, therefore, must fail. 
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POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ARREST 
JUDGMENT ON COUNT I BECAUSE, WHEN 
THE EVIDENCE IS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S 
VERDICT, IT DID NOT CREATE A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT AND 
PAUL FELICETTI WERE MARRIED ON JUNE 
19, 1993 
The statutes governing public assistance fraud criminalize 
the failure to disclose material facts, including marital status, 
that impact eligibility for public assistance. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-8-1203, 76-8-1205(11). In this case, a marriage 
between defendant and Paul Felicetti was central to the first 
count of public assistance fraud. That is, defendant's failure 
to disclose her marital status constituted the fraud that 
resulted in her receipt of more than $5000 in public assistance 
benefits. 
The following facts are undisputed. On June 19, 1993, 
defendant and Paul Felicetti were married by a bishop for the 
L.D.S. Church in front of 20-30 people (R. 154: 90-91). The 
bishop testified that after the marriage ceremony was complete, 
he "made sure that all of the witnesses had signed the document 
and that it was appropriately filled out . . . including my 
signature" (R. 154: 93). The bishop also testified that he did 
not return the documentation to the county clerk himself, as 
required by statute, but instead gave it to the parties to return 
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(R. 154: 94). The county clerk had no record of the 
documentation ever being filed (R. 155: 111).u 
At the end of the state's case, defendant moved for a 
directed verdict on Count I, arguing that the state had failed to 
present evidence of a valid marriage (R. 155: 82). The court 
took the matter under advisement (R. 155: 94). After defendant 
rested, both parties argued the question extensively (R. 155: 
110-26). For strategic reasons, defendant ultimately chose to 
withdraw the motion and await the jury's verdict (R. 155: 127). 
The jury subsequently convicted defendant on Count I (R. 107). 
Defendant responded with a motion to arrest judgment, in which he 
argued that the state had failed to carry its burden of proving 
that defendant was married as a matter of law (R. 115-19). After 
extensive arguments and discussions with counsel, the court 
ruled: "The court finds that the marriage is sufficiently flawed 
During cross-examination of the bishop who officiated at 
the marriage, defendant introduced an exhibit consisting of a 
partially-completed application for license to marry and a cover 
sheet indicating the license had never been returned. See Ex. D-
5. The bishop agreed with defendant that this document "would 
not make for a lawful, legal marriage'' (R. 154: 98). This 
statement is correct. When parties obtain an application for 
license to marry, they complete the top part of the application. 
One copy is then retained in the clerk's office, while the other, 
with the marriage license stapled to it, is given to the parties. 
This stapled document is completed by the marriage officiator and 
returned to the county clerk, where it is processed further. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-12 (1997). In this context, defendant's 
exhibit simply reflects the undisputed facts that the parties 
obtained a marriage license with the apparent intent to get 
married and that the county clerk never received the completed 
documentation. 
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by the fact that the report was not returned to the division of 
vital statistics [sic] that there is a significant question as to 
whether these parties were married" (R. 156: 18). Consequently, 
the court granted defendant's motion to arrest judgment, and 
Count I was dismissed (R. 143). 
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the 
offense that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt as to that element. See, e.g.. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 
1982); Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (1997). Here, the trial court 
arrested judgment on Count I solely because it believed the 
evidence of a marriage between defendant and Paul Felicetti was 
so inconclusive as to necessarily have created reasonable doubt 
about the existence of that element of the crime. 
As a matter of law, the trial court erred. The precise 
question at issue here is: does the officiator's failure to 
return a completed marriage license render a solemnized marriage 
void? The statutes governing marriage nowhere render a marriage 
void or invalid if the documentation is not properly returned to 
the county clerk. Sections 30-1-1 and 30-1-2, specifically 
enumerating marriages that are void or prohibited, nowhere 
mention circumstances even remotely analogous to this case. See 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-1-1 and -2 (1997). Absent statutory 
authority for invalidating a marriage, the marriage should be 
deemed valid. See Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 82-83 (1877) 
(noting that unless a marriage statute states that marriages not 
complying with its provisions are void, a marriage that would 
have been good at common law is valid even if "statutory 
directions'' have been disregarded) . 
Addressing the specific circumstances of this case, the 
marriage statutes do provide a penalty for failing to return 
completed marriage documents. Section 30-1-11, governing the 
return of the license after a marriage ceremony, as well as 
failure to do so and the resultant penalty, provides: 
The person solemnizing the marriage shall 
within 30 days thereafter return the license 
to the clerk of the county whence it issued, 
with a certificate of the marriage over his 
signature, giving the date and place of 
celebration and the names of two or more 
witnesses present at the marriage. For 
failure to make such return he shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-11 (1997). The statute thus clearly 
criminalizes a failure to return the marriage documentation by 
assessing a penalty against the officiator, the individual 
mandated by statute to make the return. Notably, the parties to 
the marriage, who have no statutory responsibility with respect 
to the documentation, are not penalized. See generally 52 Am. 
Jur. 2d Marriage § 41 (1970) (recording of marriage not essential 
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to validity because such provisions addressed to officiators 
rather than to marriage parties); 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 33 
(failure in return or record does not affect validity of 
marriage); accord Madison v. Lewis, 30 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. 
1943)(that minister who performed marriage ceremony failed to 
make a return did not affect validity of marriage); McDonald v. 
Employers Mut. Casualty Co.. 73 F.Supp. 198, 200 (La. 1947) 
(where marriage license issued and ceremony performed, there was 
"substantial compliance" with law and marriage was valid, 
notwithstanding failures of parties to sign license and of 
officiator to return it). 
Furthermore, the law evidences an intent to render all 
marriages legal from the time they are solemnized. The marriage 
ceremony is a time certain, a witnessed event, a bright line of 
demarcation between being married and being single. See 
generally 52 Am. Jur. 2d § 12 ("As soon as the ceremony is over, 
the parties have entered the binding relationship of husband and 
wife"). This general proposition is borne out by Utah's marriage 
statutes. Section 30-1-6 provides that "marriages may be 
solemnized by . . . ministers, rabbis, or priests of any 
religious denomination." Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-6 (1997). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines solemnization as "[entrance] into 
marriage publicly before witnesses in contrast to a clandestine 
or common law marriage." Black's Law Dictionary 1248 (5th ed. 
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1979) The term is synonymous with "celebration of marriage," 
which Black's further defines as "the formal act by which a man 
and a woman take each other for husband and wife." Id. at 202. 
Under a plain language interpretation, then, a marriage is 
solemnized not when the officiator makes a return on the 
documents, but when the officiator completes the marriage 
ceremony. That the marriage occurs when it is solemnized is 
buttressed by section 30-1-11, the section violated in this case, 
which states that "the person solemnizing the marriage shall 
within 30 days thereafter return the license to the clerk. . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-11 (1997). Plainly, solemnization of a 
marriage takes place at the ceremony, not at the time the 
officiator chooses to return the documents. See Walters v. 
Walters. 812 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah App. 1991)(noting that marriage 
began on date of its solemnization).12 
In the context of public assistance fraud, the trial court's 
ruling would open the door for parties to solemnize their 
marriages, willfully retain the documents, and intentionally 
invalidate their own marriages for purposes of increasing public 
assistance benefits while, at the same time, reaping the 
12
 Section 30-1-5, governing the validity of a marriage 
solemnized before an unauthorized person, further supports this 
argument. Pursuant to this section, even if the parties 
mistakenly believe the officiator has authority to marry them, 
the ceremony still constitutes a valid marriage, totally apart 
from the filing of the documentation with the county clerk. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-5 (1997). 
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cultural, moral, and religious benefits of being married.13 
Plainly, such a result would be contrary not only to the public 
assistance laws, but to public policy as well. 
If, as the trial court ruling implies, the marriage 
documentation must be filed with the county clerk within 30 days 
in order for a marriage to be valid, a variety of questions and 
policy concerns arise. The most obvious is whether any of us 
are, in fact, "legally" married. Did the officiators at our 
marriage ceremonies carry through with their statutory 
responsibilities? Is our documentation properly on file? If the 
officiator waited until the 29th day to file the papers, would a 
child conceived in the interim be legitimate or illegitimate? 
What if the officiator filed the documents two days late? Two 
months late? 
In ruling on a motion to arrest judgment, the trial court 
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. Here, the evidence was uncontroverted. The parties 
were lawfully married on June 19, 1993 (R. 154: 90). While the 
officiator's failure to properly return the documentation to the 
county clerk rendered the officiator criminally culpable, there 
is no authority to suggest that his failure rendered the parties' 
marriage invalid. Consequently, the trial court improperly 
13
 As a very general proposition, more public assistance 
benefits are available to a single parent than to one who is 
either married or cohabitating. 
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determined that the uncontroverted evidence of marriage was 
legally insufficient and improperly granted defendant's motion to 
arrest judgment. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO JOIN COUNTS I 
AND II WHERE EACH COUNT WAS BASED 
ON A FACTUALLY DIFFERENT FRAUD AND 
WHERE RELATED INSTANCES OF FRAUD 
HAD ALREADY BEEN PROPERLY 
AGGREGATED 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to 
grant her motion to join Counts I and II (Br. of App. at 30-
31).14 She bases this argument on the language of section 76-8-
1206(2), governing penalties for public assistance fraud, which 
provides: 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the 
value of an offense is calculated by 
aggregating the values of each instance of 
public assistance fraud committed by the 
defendant as part of the same facts and 
circumstances or a related series of facts 
and circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206 (2) (1995). Defendant asserts that 
because her acts of fraud arose from "a related series of facts 
and circumstances," they constituted only one offense and, 
consequently, should have been consolidated inta a single count 
(Br. of App. at 34). To support her argument, defendant 
4
 This argument need only be reached if the Court 
determines that the trial court erred in granting defendant's 
motion to arrest judgment on Count I. See supra at Point Three. 
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analogizes to the rule that permits multiple counts of theft to 
be consolidated into a single count under particular 
circumstances (Br. of App. at 31-34).15 
Defendant's argument fails because the instances of public 
assistance fraud that were related were properly aggregated 
pursuant to section 76-8-1206(2). Only the instances of public 
assistance fraud that were factually unrelated were separated 
into different counts. Thus, pursuant to the mandate of section 
76-8-1206(2), the value attached to Count I was arrived at by 
aggregating the acts of fraud that occurred on each occasion 
defendant failed to disclose her marital status to the Office of 
Family Support. These related acts of fraud as to marital status 
were evidenced by seven applications and review forms, all of 
which were signed by defendant and none of which identified Paul 
Felicetti as her spouse. See St. Exhibits S-6, S-7, S-9 through 
S-12. The values attached to these related instances of fraud, 
documented in defendant's financial assistance issuartce history 
and medical payment history, were then aggregated to arrive at 
the total amount of overpayment. See St. Exhibits. S-17, S-18; 
15
 Defendant's reliance on the law of theft consolidation 
is misplaced, where a specific statute governs imposition of 
penalties for public assistance fraud and prescribes how 
instances of such fraud should be aggregated. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1206. 
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R. 155: 34, 42. 
Similarly, for Count II, the instances of public assistance 
fraud related to defendant's failure to disclose household 
composition and income were also properly aggregated, pursuant to 
section 76-8-1206(2). These related instances of fraud, based on 
defendant's failure to disclose that Felicetti was living with 
her and earning income, were supported by public assistance 
application and review forms in which defendant made no mention 
of Felicetti at all, by a completed income and employment 
verification form for Felicetti, and by defendant's food stamp 
issuance history. See St. Exhibits S-6, S-7, S-16, S-18. The 
values attached to these related instances of fraud were 
similarly aggregated to arrive at a total overpayment. See R. 
155: 38. 
Counts I and II were not aggregated because they were 
factually unrelated. Indeed, the jury instructions made clear 
that the two counts were fundamentally different in three ways. 
First, Count I alleged a failure to disclose marital status, 
while Count II alleged a failure to disclose household 
composition and income. Second, Count I alleged that the failure 
to disclose marital status occurred between July 1, 1993 and July 
31, 1995, while Count II covered the failure to disclose 
household composition and income only between August 1, 1993, and 
February 28, 1994. Finally, Count I alleged overpayments in 
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A.F.D.C. and medical program benefits, while Count II alleged 
overpayments in food stamp benefits (R. 98-99 or addendum A). 
The undisputed documentary evidence thus supports the 
conclusion that the instances of public assistance fraud 
"committed by the defendant as part of the same facts and 
circumstances or a related series of facts and circumstances'' 
were properly aggregated in value, as mandated by section 76-8-
1206(2). Only the instances that were factually different were 
separated into different counts. For this reason, defendant's 
claim must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined, the state urges this Court to: 
affirm defendant's conviction for public assistance fraud, a 
third degree felony; reverse the trial court's grant of the 
motion to arrest judgment; and remand the case to district court 
for entry of judgment and sentencing on Count II, public 
assistance fraud, a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3jU day of February, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED - W\S 
PART 12 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD 
76-8*1201. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Overpayment* means the same as that term is defined in Section 62A-9-129. 
(2) "Provider* means the same as that term is defined in Section 
62A-11-103. 
*
 (1? TSS10 ^ste* 0 *" means the same as that term is defined in Section 62A-11-103. ««uaea m 
(4) "Recipient* means a person who receives or has received public 
assistance. y 
76-8-1202. Application of part. 
(1) This part does not apply to offenses by providers under the state's 
Medicaid program that are actionable under Title 26, Chapter 20, False Claims 
Act. 
(2) (a) Section 62A-9-131 applies to criminal actions taken under this part, 
(b) The repayment of funds or other benefits obtained in violation of the 
provisions of this chapter shall not constitute a defense or grounds for 
dismissal of a criminal action. 
76*8-1203. Disclosure required — Penalty. 
(1) Each person who applies for public assistance shall disclose to the 
Department of Human Services each fact that may materially affect the 
determination of his eligibility to receive public assistance, including his 
current: 
(a) marital status; 
(b) household composition; 
(c) employment; 
(d) income; 
(e) receipt of monetary and in-kind gifts; and 
(f) other resources. 
(2) Any person applying for public assistance who intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly fails to disclose any material fact required to be disclosed under 
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
(3) Any recipient who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose 
to the Department of Human Services any change in a material fact required 
to be disclosed under Subsection (1), within ten days after the date of the 
change, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if that failure to disclose results in 
an overpayment 
76-8-1204. Disclosure by provider required — Penalty. 
(1) (a) Any provider who solicits, requests, or receives, actually or construc-
tively, any payment or contribution through a payment, assessment, gift, 
devise, bequest, or other means, directly or indirectly, from a recipient or 
recipient's family shall notify the Department of Human Services of the 
amount of payment or contribution in writing within ten days after 
receiving that payment or contribution. 
(b) If the payment or contribution is to be made under an agreement, 
written or oral, the provider shall notify the Department of Human 
Services of the payment or contribution within ten days after entering into 
the agreement. 
(2) Any person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to notify the 
Department of Human Services as required by this section is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor. 
76-8-1205. Public assistance fraud defined. 
Each of the following persons, who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
commits any of the following acts, is guilty of public assistance fraud: 
(1) any person who uses, transfers, acquires, traffics in, falsifies, or 
possesses any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate of 
eligibility for medical services, Medicaid identification card, or public 
assistance warrant in a manner not allowed by law; 
(2) any person who fraudulently misappropriates any funds exchanged 
for food stamps, any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate 
of eligibility for medical services, Medicaid identification card, or other 
public assistance with which he has been entrusted or that has come into 
his possession in connection with his duties in administering any state or 
federally funded public assistance program; 
(3) any person who receives an unauthorized payment as a result of acts 
described in this section; 
(4) any provider who receives payment or any recipient who receives 
benefits after failing to comply with any applicable requirement in 
Sections 76-8-1203 and 76-8-1204; 
(5) any provider who files a claim for payment under any state o^r 
federally funded public assistance program for goods or services not 
provided to or for a recipient of that program; 
(6) any provider who files or falsifies a claim, report, or document 
required by state or federal law, rule, or provider agreement for goods or 
services not authorized under the state or federally funded public assis-
tance program for which the goods or services were provided; 
(7) any provider who fails to credit the state for payments received from 
other sources; 
(8) any provider who bills a recipient or a recipient's family for goods or 
services not provided, or bills in an amount greater than allowed by law or 
rule; 
(9) any recipient who, while receiving public assistance, acquires in-
come or resources in excess of the amount he previously reported to the 
Department of Human Services, and fails to notify the department within 
ten days after acquiring the excess income or resources; 
(10) any person who fails to act as required under Section 76-8-1203 or 
76-8-1204 with intent to obtain or help another obtain an •overpayment" 
as defined in Section 62A-9-129; and 
(11) any person who obtains an overpayment by violation of Section 
76-8-1203 or 76-8-1204. 
76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud. 
(1) The severity of the offense of public assistance fraud is classified in 
accordance with the value of payments, assistance, or other benefits received, 
misappropriated, claimed, or applied for as follows: 
(a) second degree felony if the value exceeds $1,000; 
(b) third degree felony if the value exceeds $250 or is up to $1,000; 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the value exceeds $100 or is up to $250; and 
(d) class B misdemeanor if the value is $100 or less. 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the value of an offense is calculated by 
aggregating the values of each instance of public assistance fraud committed 
by the defendant as part of the same facts and circumstances or a related series 
of facts and circumstances. 
(3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps that occur within a six-month 
period, committed by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to be a 
related series of facts and circumstances regardless of whether the transac-
tions are conducted with a variety of unrelated parties. 
76-8-1207. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits 
— Repayment no defense to criminal action. 
In any criminal action pursuant to this part: 
(1) a paid state warrant made to the order of a party constitutes prima 
facie evidence that the party received financial assistance from the state; 
(2) all of the records in the custody of the department relating to the 
application for, verification of, issuance of, receipt of, and use of public 
assistance constitute records of regularly conducted activity within the 
meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence; 
(3) the value of the benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or 
usual charge for similar benefits in the private sector; and 
(4) the repayment of funds or other benefits obtained in violation of the 
provisions of this part constitutes no defense to, or ground for dismissal o£ 
that action. 
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76-8-1201. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Client" means a person who receives or has received public assis-
tance. 
(2) "Overpayment" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
35A-1-502. 
(3) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
62A-1M03. 
(4) "Public assistance* means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 35A-1-102. 
76-8-1202. Application of part 
(1) This part does not apply to offenses by providers under the state's 
Medicaid program that are actionable under Title 26, Chapter 20, False Claims 
Act. 
(2) (a) Section 35A-1-503 applies to criminal actions taken under this part, 
(b) The repayment of funds or other benefits obtained in violation of the 
provisions of this chapter shall not constitute a defense or grounds for 
dismissal of a criminal actios. 
76-8-1203. Disclosure required — Penalty. 
(1) Each person who applies for public assistance shall disclose to the state 
agency administering the public assistance each fact that may materially 
affect the determination of his eligibility to receive public assistance, including 
his current: 
(a) marital status; 
(b) household composition; 
(c) employment; 
(d) income; 
(e) receipt of monetary and in-kind gifts; and 
(f) other resources. 
(2) Any person applying for public assistance who intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly fails to disclose any material fact required to be disclosed under 
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Any client who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose to 
the state agency administering the public assistance any change in a material 
fact required to be disclosed under Subsection (1), within ten days after the 
date of the change, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
76-8-1204. Disclosure by provider required — Penalty. 
(1) (a) Any provider who solicits, requests, or receives, actually or construc-
tively, any payment or contribution through a payment, assessment, gift, 
devise, bequest, or other means, directly or indirectly, from a client or 
client's family shall notify the state agency administering the public 
assistance the client is receiving of the amount of payment or contribution 
in writing within ten days after receiving that payment or contribution. 
(b) If the payment or contribution is to be made under an agreement, 
written or oral, the provider shall notify the state agency administering 
the public assistance the client is receiving of the payment or contribution 
within ten days after entering into the agreement. 
(2) Any person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to notify the 
state agency administering the public assistance the client is receiving as 
required by this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
76-8-1205. Public assistance fraud defined. 
Each of the following persons, who intentionally, knowingly, t>r recklessly 
commits any of the following acts, is guilty of public assistance fraud: 
(1) any person who uses, transfers, acquires, traffics in, falsifies, or 
possesses any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate of 
eligibility for medical services, Medicaid identification card, fund transfer 
instrument, payment instrument, or public assistance warrant in a 
manner not allowed by law; 
(2) any person who fraudulently misappropriates any funds exchanged 
for food stamps, any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate 
of eligibility for medical services, Medicaid identification card, or other 
public assistance with which he has been entrusted or that has come into 
his possession in connection with his duties in administering any state or 
federally funded public assistance program; 
(3) any person who receives an unauthorized payment as a result of acts 
described in this section; 
(4) any provider who receives payment or any client who receives 
benefits after failing to comply with any applicable requirement in 
Sections 76-8*1203 and 76-8-1204; 
(5) any provider who files a claim for payment under any state or 
federally funded public assistance program for goods or services not 
provided to or for a client of that program; 
(6) any provider who files or falsifies a claim, report, or document 
required by state or federal law, rule, or provider agreement for goods or 
services not authorized under the state or federally funded public assis-
tance program for which the goods or services were provided; 
(7) any provider who fails to credit the state for payments received from 
other sources; 
<8) any provider who bills a client or a client's family for goods or 
services not provided, or bills in an amount greater than allowed by law or 
rule; 
(9) any client who, while receiving public assistance, acquires income or 
resources in excess of the amount he previously reported to the state 
agency administering the public assistance, and fails to notify the state 
agency to which the client previously reported within ten days after 
acquiring the excess income or resources; 
(10) any person who fails to act as required under Section 76-8-1203 or 
76-8-1204 with intent to obtain or help another obtain an "overpayment" 
as defined in Section 35A-1-502; and 
(11) any person who obtains an overpayment by violation of Section 
76-8-1203 or 76-8-1204. 
76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud. 
(1) The severity of the offense of public assistance fraud is classified in 
accordance with the value of payments, assistance, or other benefits received, 
misappropriated, claimed, or applied for as follows: 
(a) second degree felony if the value is or exceeds $5,000; 
(b) third degreeielony if the value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than 
$5,000; 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the value is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; and 
(d) class B misdemeanor if the value is less than $300. 
(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the value of an offense is calculated by 
aggregating the values of each instance of public assistance fraud committed 
by the defendant as part of the same facts and circumstances or a related series 
of facts and circumstances. 
(3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps that occur within a six-month 
period, committed by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to be a 
related series of facts and circumstances regardless of whether the transac-
tions are conducted with a variety of unrelated parties. 
